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Abstract
This paper studies the e¤ects of di¤erent types of research policy on economic growth. We …nd that
while tax incentives to private research, public funding of private projects, and basic research performed at
public institutions have unambiguously positive e¤ects on economic growth, performing applied research
at public institutions could have negative growth e¤ects. This is due to the large crowding out of private
research caused by public R&D when it competes with private …rms in the “patent race”. Concerning the
e¤ects of these policies on welfare, it is found that research policy can either improve or reduce consumer
welfare depending on the characteristics of the policy and that an excessively high research subsidy will
reduce it.
¤I am thankful to Jordi Caballé for his valuable comments and directions. I would also like to aknowledge the help of David
Pérez-Castrillo with the initial design of the R&D sector.
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1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to study the e¤ect of public research policy on both the productivity of private
R&D and the growth performance of the economy. In order to do so, we will consider di¤erent research
policies in the context of an endogenous growth model, where we make explicit the di¤erence between basic
and applied research.
Previous literature on public intervention in the research sector is mainly undertaken from the industrial
organization perspective. Papers on this area are generally concerned with the microeconomic e¤ects of
research subsidies and patent policy. Some attention has been paid, however, to public research. The papers
by Mamuneas and Nadiri (1996), Ham and Mowery (1998) and Mamuneas (1999) provide microeconomic
foundations for the hypothesis that public R&D causes positive external e¤ects on private productivity. In
addition, Mamuneas and Nadiri (1996) …nd econometric evidence that publicly …nanced R&D induces cost
savings but crowds out privately …nanced R&D investment.
There are few papers that consider public research investment from a macroeconomic perspective. Glomm
and Ravikumar (1994) present a model in which the economy grows thanks to public research. However, this
paper is focussed on distributional problems and, therefore, the presence of public research in this model is
just a simplifying assumption in order to obtain endogenous technological innovation without the di¢culties
that would imply the introduction of a private R&D sector. Pelloni (1997) allows the government to invest
in public research so as to improve the growth performance of the economy but does not allow for private
research. On the contrary, Park (1998) considers both public and private research. This author introduces
public research in the model of expanding variety of products …rst presented in Romer (1990). He assumes
that public research indirectly contributes to economic growth because it causes a positive external e¤ect
on the knowledge accumulation of the private sector. However, the paper is mainly concerned with open
economies issues and international spillovers rather than with public research policy. This last paper does not
distinguish between basic and applied research. Indeed, the di¤erence between basic and applied research
is absent from all the papers previously mentioned. Very few authors have tried to address the issue of
basic versus applied research, especially in a macroeconomic context. The paper by David (2000) reviews
the literature and establishes the main debates on the issue of public science, focusing on the di¤erences
between basic and applied research and the need for public provision of basic knowledge. Similarly, the
work of David and Hall (2000) analyzes the e¤ects of the various public research policies on private R&D
expenditures, though the analysis is performed by means of a simple, partial equilibrium, static model.
Regarding empirical studies on the in‡uence of R&D expenditures on productivity growth, Griliches (1986)
…nds evidence of the positive e¤ects of both publicly …nanced R&D and basic research while Mans…eld (1995)
analyses the interaction between academic research and industrial innovation. The most recent econometric
work on the relationship between public and private research is surveyed in David, Hall and Toole (2000).
However, there still exists a need for a theoretical model able to modelize the e¤ects of research policy on
economic growth.
In order to bring the analysis closer to reality, we have considered the main policy responses that actual
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governments use to prevent private underprovision of research. These policies are usually classi…ed in two
groups. The …rst one concerns the direct procurement of research in public facilities, while the second includes
policies consisting on giving incentives for a greater amount of private investment. These incentives can take
the form of tax reductions intended to reduce the cost of R&D but they can also involve direct funding of
speci…c R&D programs. We will modelize these types of policies in the framework of an endogenous growth
model.
There exists a growing debate concerning whether public research should take the form of basic or applied
research and whether it should be performed at public institutions or in close coordination with private …rms.
We will make explicit the di¤erence between basic and applied research and explore the di¤erent e¤ects that
the various policies available could have on the R&D sector and the economy as a whole.
The basic model we propose as framework for this analysis is the one …rst presented in Aghion and Howitt
(1998). In this model, the economy grows thanks to both capital accumulation and technological change.
Therefore, this model overcomes one of the main objections traditionally raised against technological change
models, namely, that capital accumulation was ignored as a source of growth. Furthermore, the presence of a
continuum of research sectors eliminates uncertainty at the aggregate, allowing for the use of non-stochastic
steady state analysis at the macroeconomic level. In Aghion and Howitt model, …rms invest in research
projects that yield a new product or a new production technology with a certain probability. In the present
model, we want to introduce a distinction between basic and applied research. Intuitively, applied research is
aimed at obtaining innovations able to improve a particular production technology or that can give raise to
a new product or variety. On the contrary, basic research is usually concerned with projects whose outcomes
do not normally have a direct market application, though they add to the knowledge base. This does not
necessarily mean that private …rms will not perform basic research, since we consider that even though basic
research alone would not be able to produce a marketable innovation, it is able to increase the productivity of
applied research. This is due to the fact that basic science allows researchers in applied …elds to understand
previous knowledge or to adapt innovations from other …elds to their own sector.
We …nd that subsidies to private research increase R&D investment, both in applied and basic …elds,
and that this policy is bene…cial for long term growth. However, the e¤ect on steady state consumption is
generally negative and, therefore, the …nal e¤ect on welfare results from the trade o¤ between consumption
and growth. Due to this fact, the sign of the e¤ect on welfare is ambiguous. For a empirically acceptable
set of parameter values, a marginal subsidy to research would have positive e¤ects though excessively high
values of the subsidy could harm welfare rather than improve it.
Concerning the other available policy instruments, we will di¤erentiate public production of research from
direct funding of R&D projects in the following manner: when research is performed at public institutions,
any innovation with a market application that arises from public research will compete with private research
in the concession of patents. On the other hand, direct funding of research consists of public aids to private
projects which, if successful, will keep the patent in the private sector. Consider thus …rst the case in which
the public sector performs exclusively basic research at public institutions. This type of research increases
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aggregate knowledge and will a¤ect private …rms only through the spillovers created by the faster growing
base of knowledge. In other words, the faster accumulation of non-rival and non-excludable knowledge
will induce a more important technology improvement when an innovation occurs in the private sector.
The growth e¤ect of a higher public budget for research is unambiguously positive while the welfare e¤ect,
calibrated for empirically acceptable values of the parameters, seems to be also positive.
When the public sector is allowed to perform both applied and basic research, it may happen that a public
project gains the patent in a given sector. In this sense, the public sector behaves as a direct competitor
of private research …rms and therefore, the public investment in research should be taken into account
when computing the sector’s rate of replacement. This rate is given by the probability that an innovation
occurs in a given sector, which in turn is determined by the amount of research invested in that sector. A
higher rate of replacement implies a lower value of the innovation because it reduces the expected life of the
patent. Therefore, even though public research will add to the accumulation of knowledge, it also causes this
“business-stealing” e¤ect that crowds out private research. Consequently, the net result on the growth rate
will depend on which e¤ect dominates and on the actual values of private and public research. We …nd that
in order to have a positive e¤ect on growth of either type of public R&D, the amounts of public applied and
basic research must keep certain proportions. In particular, we …nd that increasing public applied research
from zero, the crowding out of private research is so large that the e¤ect on growth will initially be negative
for any given value of public basic research. However, if we keep increasing public applied research, the
e¤ect on growth will become positive. This is due to the fact that public research is actually substituting
private R&D as the source of innovative activity. Indeed, it is relatively easy to crowd out completely private
research when the public sector performs both applied and basic research. With regard to the welfare change
induced by this policy, again the opposite behavior of consumption and growth forces a calibration in order
to obtain a sign. The calibration suggests that welfare may be improved with both types of public research
though the introduction of applied public research will initially reduce welfare. Similarly, excessive amounts
of public research will determine low levels of steady state consumption per e¢ciency unit which eventually,
will impede further welfare improvements.
An alternative policy instrument is direct funding of speci…c research projects. In order to simplify and
to di¤erentiate it clearly from the previous policy, we assume that the government provides a given amount
of output to be used in a speci…c project, either applied or basic, but that in case of success, the patent
remains with the research …rm. The implications of this type of …nancing di¤er from the previous policy
in the sense that the amount of research …nanced by the public sector increases the productivity of private
research. This is so because in order to obtain a given probability of success, the private investment required
is smaller the larger the amount …nanced by the government. We still …nd the “business stealing” e¤ect
of the previous policy but it is now softened by the increase of research productivity. Consequently, the
e¤ects on growth of both applied and basic research are unambiguously positive. Remarkably, we …nd that
in equilibrium, the e¤ects on growth and research intensity of public basic and applied research are identical,
which suggests that if the research policy is developed through direct funding of private projects, the relevant
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amount is the total research investment and not whether it has been devoted to applied or basic projects.
Another relevant di¤erence with respect to public production of research is the impact on the amount of
private investment in research. While research performed at public institutions causes a clear crowding out
of private R&D investment, the e¤ect of direct funding is ambiguous. Depending on the actual values of
the parameters, we can even …nd that public and private research behave as complements at the steady
state. The econometric evidence is not clear at this point. While some studies identify public and private
research as substitutes, other works …nd that an increase in public research may cause a parallel increase in
private R&D investment.1 The fact that data on R&D expenditures usually include together both public
research and public funding of private projects may be one of the causes of the present di¢culties to settle
the question. With respect to the welfare e¤ects of this policy, again the trade o¤ between consumption
and growth determines a positive impact on welfare for small values of public research investment that may
become negative for higher values as consumption per e¢ciency unit diminishes.
In summary, the results suggest that while tax incentives to private research always have a positive
growth e¤ect, public research may not be the appropriate policy in some circumstances. We …nd that
research performed at public institutions is always bene…cial if it is only concerned with basic research.
However, if public institutions do investigate also in applied …elds, the impact on long run growth may be
negative when some conditions are met. The condition for a positive growth e¤ect requires that the relative
amounts of applied and basic research lie between some limits, and that one of them is not excessive with
respect to the other. For instance, if the amounts of basic and applied research are chosen so as to maximize
the probability of success for a given amount of total investment, the e¤ect on growth is always positive,
though the crowding out of private research is so important that it would be relatively easy to crowd it out
completely. We also …nd that direct funding of research has unambiguously positive growth e¤ects.
The rest of the paper is divided into the following sections: section 2 presents the model, sections 3 and
4 present the steady state and welfare analysis and section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
We consider a growth model with endogenous technological change in which research may be performed
by both the private and the public sector. Long run economic growth comes from both technological
innovation and capital accumulation. There exist two types of research projects depending on whether they
are concerned with basic or applied issues. Successful applied projects produce a new technology that will
generate monopoly rents for the owner of the patent. Research projects focused exclusively on basic …elds
are not able to generate a new product or variety though they contribute to the accumulation of general
knowledge. In combination with applied research, basic research is able to increase R&D productivity
because it facilitates the absorption of intersectoral and intertemporal spillovers. As a consequence, private
…rms will only engage in projects with an applied component though they may …nd it optimal to devote
1See David et al (2000).
5
some additional resources to basic research in order to increase the productivity of their own research.
2.1 Consumers
There exists an in…nitely lived representative consumer whose utility function is assumed to be logarithmic
for the sake of simplicity. Consequently, the lifetime utility of the consumer will be given by the following
expression:
V (Ct) =
Z 1
0
ln(Ct)e
¡½tdt; (1)
where Ct is consumption at time t and ½ is the rate of discount.
2.2 Final good sector
The consumption good is produced in a competitive market out of labor and intermediate goods. Labor is
represented by a continuous mass of individuals L; and it is assumed to be inelastically supplied. Intermediate
goods are produced by a continuum of sectors of mass 1, being mit the supply of sector i at date t: The
production function is a Cobb-Douglas with constant returns on intermediate goods and e¢ciency units of
labor
Yt = L
1¡®
Z 1
0
Aitm
®
itdi; (2)
where Yt is …nal good production and Ait is the productivity coe¢cient of each sector. The evolution of each
sector’s productivity coe¢cient Ait is determined in the research sector. I assume equal factor intensity to
simplify calculations.
2.3 Intermediate goods
Intermediate goods are used as factors of production in the …nal good sector. Each sector has a monopolistic
structure. In order to become the monopolist producer of an intermediate good, the entrepreneur has to buy
the patent of the latest version of the product. This patent gives him the right to produce the good until an
innovation occurs and the monopolist is displaced by the owner of the new technology.
The only input in the production of intermediate goods is capital. In particular, it is assumed that Ait
units of capital are needed to produce one unit of intermediate good i at date t: This implies that more
productive intermediate inputs are more capital intensive, an assumption that simpli…es the analysis and
has no important implications under the Cobb-Douglas conditions.
Capital is rented in a perfectly competitive market at rate ³t: Hence, the cost of one unit of intermediate
good is Ait³t: On the other hand, the equilibrium price of the intermediate good, p(mit) will be its marginal
product
p(mit) = ®L
1¡®Aitm®¡1it ;
6
wheremit is production of intermediate good i at date t: Thus, the monopolist’s pro…t maximization problem
is the following:
¼it = max
mit
[p(mit)mit ¡Ait³tmit]
subject to p(mit) = ®L
1¡®Aitm®¡1it ;
from where we obtain the pro…t-maximizing supply and the ‡ow of pro…ts as
mit = L
µ
®2
³t
¶ 1
1¡®
¼it = ®(1¡ ®)L1¡®Aitm®it:
Due to the assumption of equal factor intensity, supply of intermediate goods is equal in all sectors,
mit = mt. Thus, the aggregate demand of capital is equal to
R 1
0 Aitmtdi: Let At =
R 1
0 Aitdi; be the
aggregate productivity coe¢cient. Then, equilibrium in the capital market requires demand to equal supply
Atmt = Kt;
or equivalently, the ‡ow of intermediate output must be equal to capital intensity, kt
mt = kt =
Kt
At
:
With this notation we can express the equilibrium rental rate in terms of capital intensity
³t = ®
2L1¡®kt®¡1: (3)
2.4 Research sector
For each of the above intermediate sectors, there is a number of research …rms competing in a patent race
to get the next innovation. Innovations are produced using the same technology of the …nal good. Hence, it
needs physical capital (embodied in the intermediate goods) apart from labor to be produced. Technology
is assumed to be increasingly complex and hence further innovations will require higher investments. Ac-
cordingly, the amount invested in research in each sector Nit will be adjusted by a coe¢cient representing
the aggregate state of knowledge. This coe¢cient will be given by Amaxt ; the productivity parameter of the
leading edge technology. Hence, we may de…ne nit = NitAmaxt as the productivity adjusted level of research:
The arrival rate of innovations at each sector is given by the following expression:
[¸na (1 + bnb)]
1
2 ; (4)
where ¸ is a positive parameter representing the productivity of research, na and nb are the levels of research
intensity devoted to applied and basic issues respectively, and b is a positive parameter that measures the
in‡uence of basic research on the total private research productivity.2 This functional form tries to capture
2For the functional form of the contributions of basic and applied research to the probability of success we follow Cassiman,
Pérez-Castrillo and Veugelers (2001).
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the idea that basic research is not essential in order to obtain an innovation with market applications as
opposed to applied research, which is assumed to be essential. Given the total amount nit of research, the
…rm will choose na and nb in order to maximize the probability of obtaining an innovation. The optimal
shares are thus,
na =
8<: nit2 + 12b if nit > 1bnit otherwise: (5)
nb =
8<: nit2 ¡ 12b if nit > 1b0 otherwise: (6)
In order to simplify the analysis, we will consider only those situations in which private …rms invest in basic
research, that is, nit > 1b :
3 The results when this assumption is not satis…ed are presented in Appendix D.
In equilibrium, the arrival rate of innovations in sector i will be given by the following expression
¸p (nit) = ¸
µ
1 + bnit
2
p
b
¶
;
which may be obtained substituting (5) and (6) in (4).
The payo¤ to innovators if they succeed is the ‡ow of pro…ts obtained from the monopolistic exploitation
of the new technology. The value of this payo¤ is identical for any researcher innovating at t and therefore,
research intensity will be the same across sectors. Consequently, we drop the i subindex from research
intensity.
When an innovation occurs in a given sector, the productivity parameter of that sector jumps discontinu-
ously to Amaxt ; the leading edge productivity coe¢cient. Thus, advances in other sectors spillover to the rest
of the economy making the technology improvement induced by the next innovation more important. The
evolution of Amaxt is determined by the evolution of the aggregate state of knowledge:While for a particular
…rm we assumed that basic research was not essential in order to obtain an innovation, in the case of the
aggregate state of knowledge, we are going to assume that both basic and applied research are essential
factors. This assumption re‡ects the extended belief that in the long run, the knowledge base cannot go on
growing if basic knowledge is not further developed.4 Consequently, we assume that the rate of growth of
Amaxt is given by the following expression:
_Amaxt
Amaxt
= ¾¸ (nA)
¯ (nB)
1¡¯
;
where nA and nB are total applied and basic research intensity, that is, including both public and private
research. Under these assumptions, the distribution of productivity parameters across sectors will change
as Amaxt grows. However, if we de…ne the relative productivity parameter of a sector as ait =
Ait
Amaxt
; one can
prove that the distribution of ait converges to a stationary distribution. In addition, the stationarity of the
distribution of a implies that the aggregate and the leading edge productivities are proportional.5
3 See Appendix D for the parameter restrictions necessary to guarantee this condition.
4 See David (2000).
5For the distribution of relative productivities across sectors see Appendix A.
Let h (a) be the density function of a: Then, by de…nition, At =
R 1
0 Aitdi = A
max
t
R 1
0 aitdi = A
max
t
R 1
0 ah (a) da = A
max
t E (a) :
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In order to determine private research intensity, consider the value of obtaining an innovation at time
t: When the innovation occurs, a new technology with a productivity parameter Amaxt is available for the
owner of the patent. The new producer will force the previous incumbent out of the market and will start
producing as a monopolist. Therefore, the ‡ow of pro…ts will be given by the following expression:
® (1¡ ®)L1¡®Amaxt k®t :
The new producer will be able to keep its monopolistic position until a new innovation occurs in that sector.
Therefore, the present value of the innovation at time t is given by
Vt =
Z 1
t
e¡
R
¿
t
[rs+¸p(nit)]ds(1¡ ®)®Amaxt L1¡®k®¿ d¿;
where ¸p (nit) is the ‡ow probability that an innovation occurs in that sector.
The cost of one unit of research in terms of output is 1. Therefore, since nt = NtAmaxt ; the cost of one unit
of research intensity is Amaxt :We assume that there exists a proportional subsidy to innovation that reduces
its cost. Thus, the marginal cost of increasing research intensity is (1¡ sn)Amaxt units of output, where sn
is the subsidy to innovative activity. The marginal bene…t of one unit of research intensity is the product of
the value of the innovation Vt and the private marginal e¤ect of research on that sector’s rate of innovation
¸p(nt)nt : Thus, the research …rm sees itself as facing a constant arrival rate ¸
p(nt)
nt
njt per unit of research
expenditure where nt is the sector’s R&D expenditure and njt is the …rm’s research intensity. Hence, the
research arbitrage condition is
1¡ sn =
µ
¸p (nt)
nt
¶µ
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®k®t
rt + ¸p (nt)
¶
: (7)
Notice that this arbitrage condition establishes a relationship between the equilibrium values of capital and
research intensity.
2.5 Capital market
Capital is used as a factor of production in the intermediate goods sector. We have seen that equilibrium in
the capital market requires the rental rate to satisfy equation (3). The owner of a unit of capital will obtain
³t for it. This amount must be enough to cover the cost of capital. This includes the rate of interest (rt),
the depreciation rate (±), and the tax rate on capital accumulation (¿k). Hence, the capital market arbitrage
equation is
rt + ± + ¿k = ®
2L1¡®kt®¡1; (8)
which establishes a decreasing relationship between the interest rate and capital intensity.
2.6 Research policy
There exist three major types of public intervention in the research sector. The …rst one, already introduced
in the model, consists of tax incentives to reduce the private cost of research production. In addition, the
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government may directly modify the total amount of output invested in research. We will assume that it can
do so in two di¤erent ways. It can produce research at public institutions without any kind of collaboration
with private …rms and in direct competition with them. This policy is dubbed public provision of research.
On the other hand, the government may fund private projects, acting in close collaboration with private
…rms. To simplify, the government is assumed to act altruistically in this case, which implies that the patent
remains with the private …rm. To di¤erentiate it from the previous policy, we will refer to this one as public
funding. Let us now analyze the implications for the basic model of these two types of policies.
2.6.1 Public provision of research.
Assume the government can perform research in the same conditions as private …rms and de…ne ~¡a and ~¡b
as the amounts of output invested in applied and basic research by public institutions.6 Thus, public applied
and basic research intensity will be given by ¡a =
~¡a
Amaxt
and ¡b =
~¡b
Amaxt
: Therefore, the probability that the
public sector gets an innovation will be given by ¸ [¡a (1 + b¡b)]
1
2 : The additional research implies that the
total probability of an innovation occurring in a given sector will now be ¸ [na (1 + bnb)]
1
2 +¸ [¡a (1 + b¡b)]
1
2 :
Consequently, the research arbitrage equation will be given by
1¡ sn =
µ
¸p (n)
n
¶Ã
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®k®t
rt + ¸p (n) + ¸ [¡a (1 + b¡b)]
1
2
!
: (9)
Notice that public research in this case induces a higher rate of creative destruction, i.e. a higher probability
that the owner of the patent is replaced. Therefore, the research activity of the public sector reduces the
present value of an innovation for a private researcher. In the case that the public sector gets the patent, it
will be sold to an intermediate good producer and the value of the patent will be transferred to consumers
in the form of a lump sum transfer.
2.6.2 Public funding of research.
This type of research policy directly a¤ects the microeconomic decision of the research …rm about the
amounts to be invested in basic and applied research. Consequently, we must rewrite the problem of the
…rm as follows:
max
na;nb
¸ [(na +¡a) (1 + b (nb + ¡b))]
1
2 ; (10)
subject to the following constraints:
nit = na + nb
na ¸ 0
nb ¸ 0:
6We assume that the amount invested in each sector is the same so that aggregate and sectoral amounts coincide.
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The optimal choices for na and nb are
na =
8<: nit+¡b¡¡a2 + 12b if nit +¡a ¡ ¡b ¸ 1bnit otherwise,
nb =
8<: nit+¡a¡¡b2 ¡ 12b if nit +¡a ¡ ¡b ¸ 1b0 otherwise.
We will consider only situations with nb positive in the main text. The results when private …rms do not
perform basic research may be found in Appendix D. For na and nb positive, the probability of obtaining
an innovation given nit is
¸p (nit;¡) =
¸ [1 + b (nit +¡)]
2
p
b
; (11)
where ¡ = ¡a + ¡b: Again, the symmetric behavior of the sectors in equilibrium allows us to drop the i
subindex of nit in (11). The probability of the project being successful per unit of research intensity is thus
¸p (nt;¡)
nt
:
Therefore, the research arbitrage equation is given by
1¡ sn =
µ
¸p (nt;¡)
nt
¶µ
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®k®t
rt + ¸p (nt;¡)
¶
:
The main di¤erence with the previous policy in terms of the implications for the research arbitrage equation,
is that even though the e¤ect on the rate of creative destruction still remains, there is an additional e¤ect
on the productivity of research. This e¤ect is represented by the fact that in the presence of public funding,
the probability of obtaining an innovation per unit of private research intensity is now given by ¸(1+b(n+¡))
2
p
bn
rather than by ¸(1+bn)
2
p
bn
:
2.7 Equilibrium
General equilibrium is de…ned by the two equations determining equilibrium in the capital and research
sectors. These equations are
rt + ± + ¿k = ®
2L1¡®kt®¡1; (12)
for the capital market and
1¡ sn =
µ
¸p (nt)
nt
¶Ã
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®k®t
rt + ¸p (nt) + ¸ [¡a (1 + b¡b)]
1
2
!
; (13)
for the research market in the case of public provision or,
1¡ sn =
µ
¸p (nt;¡)
nt
¶µ
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®k®t
rt + ¸p (nt;¡)
¶
; (14)
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for the case of public funding.
The systems formed by equations (12) and (13), and (12) and (14) de…ne the equilibrium values for kt
and nt in each case. These systems implicitly determine a relationship between capital and research intensity
that allows us to analyze the dynamics of the model in terms of capital and consumption. The laws of motion
for capital and consumption are given by
¢
Kt = Yt ¡Ct ¡Nt ¡ ±Kt;
and
¢
Ct = (rt ¡ ½)Ct; (15)
where (15) is derived from the consumer’s optimization problem. These expressions can be written in
e¢ciency units as follows:
¢
kt = L
1¡®k®t ¡ ct ¡
1
E (a)
nt ¡ (± + °t)kt (16)
¢
ct = (rt ¡ ½¡ °t)ct; (17)
where °t is the growth rate of A
max
t and therefore is given by ¾¸ (nA)
¯ (nB)
1¡¯ which, ultimately is a
continuous function of nt. Let nd(kt) be the dynamic relationship between capital and research intensity
de…ned by equations (12) and (13) or (12) and (14).7 Then, we can express equations (16) and (17) in terms
of kt and ct exclusively
¢
kt = L
1¡®k®t ¡ ct ¡
1
E (a)
nd(kt)¡ (± + °d(kt))kt (18)
¢
ct = (®
2L1¡®k®¡1t ¡ ± ¡ ¿k ¡ ½¡ °d(kt))ct: (19)
Due to the non-linearity of the system we proceed with its linearization around the steady state in order to
analyze the dynamics of the model. It can be proved that the system exhibits local saddle path stability
around the steady state. Therefore, we can perform comparative statics analysis at the long run equilibrium.
3 Steady state
In equilibrium the production function is simpli…ed due to the fact that the equilibrium value of intermediate
input is the same for every sector. Consequently, we may write equation (2) as
Yt = AtL
1¡®k®t ;
7 Speci…cally, nd(kt) is obtained as follows: equation (12) de…nes the interest rate as a function of kt: Therefore, we can
substitute in either (13) or (14) so as to obtain nt as an implicit function of capital intensity. Depending on whether we are
considering public provision or direct funding, nd(kt) is de…ned by equation (13) or (14). Consequently, we should use a di¤erent
notation for each function. However, for the sake of simplicity and because the implications for the dynamics of the model are
equivalent, we denote the two functions by nd(kt):
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which implies that in a steady state, the rate of growth of output will be the rate of growth of aggregate
productivity. That is
° = ¾¸ (nA)
¯ (nB)
1¡¯
: (20)
Using this result, and the fact that in a steady state k and n are constant we may write equations (12), (13)
and (14) as follows:
° + ½+ ± + ¿k = ®
2L1¡®k®¡1; (21)
1¡ sn =
µ
¸p (n)
n
¶Ã
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®k®
° + ½+ ¸p (n) + ¸ [¡a (1 + b¡b)]
1
2
!
; (22)
1¡ sn =
µ
¸p (n;¡)
n
¶µ
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®k®
° + ½+ ¸p (n;¡)
¶
: (23)
Equations (21) and (22) on one hand and (21) and (23) on the other determine the steady state values of k
and n for the two alternative assumptions. Let us consider the two research policies separately.
3.1 Public provision
If research is performed at public institutions, in direct competition with private …rms, the equations de-
termining k and n are (21) and (22). The growth e¤ect of giving tax incentives to private research …rms is
established in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The long run growth rate increases when the subsidy rate to private research is raised.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The cost reduction induced by the subsidy increases the optimal choice of private research intensity. The
higher investment in research implies a larger productivity growth and hence, the economy will grow faster.
Concerning the e¤ect of public provision of research, notice that if no public applied research is performed,
the amount of basic research produced at public institutions does not a¤ect the rate of creative destruction.
However, this research adds to the stock of knowledge and will make private research more productive via
spillovers, both of the intertemporal and intersectoral varieties. Therefore, the e¤ect on growth of increasing
public investment in basic research should be positive. However, a higher value of ¡b will reduce private
research intensity. This crowding out of private research is due to the increase in factor prices induced by the
higher public investment. Nevertheless, the reduction in private research is not large enough to compensate
for the positive e¤ect of the public investment and the …nal net result on the growth rate is positive. On the
contrary, if public applied research is positive then basic research has an additional e¤ect. Namely, that it
will increase the probability that the public sector gains a patent. This will induce a larger crowding out of
private research and reduce the expected life of any future innovation, because the rate of replacement will
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be higher. Whether the …nal impact on growth will be positive or negative depends upon the levels of public
basic and applied research and on the parameter values. Due to the ambiguity in the sign of the growth
e¤ect we proceed to de…ne parameter subspaces for which the growth derivative shows the desired sign. Let
us de…ne the following vectors of parameters: µ ´ (®; ±; ½; ¸; sn; ¿k; ¾; L) 2 £ where £ ´ [0; 1]6 £ (0;1)2,
Ã ´ (¯; b;¡a;¡b) 2 ª where ª ´ [0; 1] £ [0;1)3 and ! ´ µ £ Ã 2 £ £ ª: Denote the parameter space by
­ ´ ££ª and de…ne the following subspaces of ª and ­ :
ª1 =
½
Ã 2 ª
¯¯¯¯
either 12(1¡¯)
³
b¡a
1+b¡b
´ 1
2
< 1 and 1 + b (¡a ¡ ¡b) > 0
or 12
³
b¡a
1+b¡b
´ 1
2
³
1 +
³
¯
1¡¯
´
b¡b
1+b¡a
´
< 1 and 1 + b (¡a ¡ ¡b) < 0
¾
;
ª2 =
½
Ã 2 ª
¯¯¯¯
either 12¯
³
1+b¡b
b¡a
´ 1
2
< 1; ¡a > 0 and 1 + b (¡a ¡ ¡b) < 0
or 12
³
1+b¡b
b¡a
´ 1
2
³
1 +
³
1¡¯
¯
´
1+b¡a
b¡b
´
< 1; ¡a > 0 and 1 + b (¡a ¡ ¡b) > 0
¾
;
­1 =
½
! 2 ­
¯¯¯¯
1
2
³
b¡a
1+b¡b
´ 1
2
> 1 + ²; Â1 > Â2 and Â3 < Â4
¾
;
and
­2 =
½
! 2 ­
¯¯¯¯
1
2
³
1+b¡b
b¡a
´ 1
2
> 1 + ²; Â1 > Â2 and Â3 < Â4
¾
;
where ²; Â1; Â2; Â3 and Â4 are de…ned in Appendix B.1. The following propositions establish the e¤ect
of public basic and applied research on growth:
Proposition 2 If either ¡a = 0 or Ã 2 ª1 then, the e¤ect on growth of public basic research is positive.
Conversely, if ! 2 ­1; the growth e¤ect of ¡b is negative.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Proposition 2 implies that the e¤ect on growth of public basic research is ambiguous when there exists
a positive level of public applied research. Intuitively, a larger public investment in basic research will make
the economy grow faster when the existing level of public applied research is not too large and ¡b keeps in
a certain range relative to ¡a: On the contrary, in order to …nd a negative e¤ect on growth, the amount of
public applied research must be very large relative to the amount of public basic research. In any case, when
both ¡a and ¡b are very large, the e¤ect on growth will generally be positive, due to the fact that for high
levels of public research intensity, the level of private research will be so low that the relevant variables for
the growth rate of the economy will be the amounts of public investment.
Proposition 3 If Ã 2 ª2 then the e¤ect on growth of public applied research is positive. On the contrary,
if ! 2 ­2 then d°d¡a < 0:
14
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
If the public sector decides to increase public applied research from zero, the most relevant e¤ect will be
a large crowding out of private research. As a consequence, the rate of growth of the economy will generally
fall when the levels of public applied research are close to zero. However, if public investment in applied
research keeps growing the e¤ect on growth may be inverted. This is so because the crowding out of private
research is smaller as ¡a grows. The conditions in Proposition 3 require large values of both basic and applied
public research in order to have a positive e¤ect on growth of ¡a and small values of public applied research
or large di¤erences between basic and applied investments in order to have a negative e¤ect on growth.
In summary, what the previous propositions require is that the amounts invested in applied and basic
research keep certain proportions. If the investment in one of the two types of research is too large or too
small relative to the other then the e¤ect on growth will be negative. Accordingly, it appears interesting to
analyze the implications of public R&D when it is divided into basic and applied research following a certain
rule. Given that this type of public intervention depicts the public sector behaving as a private research …rm,
we want to consider also the e¤ect of public research if the amounts of public basic and applied research
are chosen so as to get the maximum probability of obtaining an innovation for a given amount of public
investment in research. In other words, let ¡ = ¡a + ¡b; ¡a = 1+b¡2b and ¡b =
b¡¡1
2b for ¡ ¸ 1b : Then,
(¡a(1 + b¡b))
1
2 = p (¡) and the comparative statics results of marginal changes in ¡ are as follows:
Proposition 4 The e¤ect on the steady state growth rate of a marginal increase in ¡ is positive.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The result established in the previous proposition implies that the public sector can actually substitute
the private research sector and, since we have assumed the same productivity for the private and the public
sector, this would be bene…cial for the growth performance of the economy. However, this result is due
to the assumption that the amount of research invested by the public sector is not limited by pro…tability
conditions, since it may be …nanced by lump sum taxes. If we assumed instead that the public sector must
look for …nance in the creditl market, then it would be constrained by the same research arbitrage equation
as private …rms, and there would exist a maximum level of research at which its marginal cost equals the
marginal bene…t.
3.2 Public funding
If research policy consists on the provision of funds for private …rms’ research projects, the relevant equations
in order to determine the steady state values of n and k are (21) and (23). In this case, the following
propositions apply:
Proposition 5 A higher subsidy rate to private research increases the steady state growth rate of the econ-
omy.
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Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Proposition 5 shows that the e¤ect of a subsidy to private research is not a¤ected by the assumption on
whether public research is performed at public institutions or in coordination with private …rms. Thus, the
concession of tax incentives to private research continues having a positive e¤ect on long run growth, since
it increases the amount of private research intensity. Notice also that an increase in n reduces the ratio of
total applied research to total basic research. This may suggest that the privately chosen amounts of applied
and basic research are biased towards applied research, while the economy could bene…t from a reduction of
this ratio. With respect to the e¤ects of the amounts devoted to public research, we …nd that they are quite
di¤erent to public provision, as the next proposition establishes:
Proposition 6 A higher research intensity in either applied or basic …elds implies a larger rate of growth
in the long run. In equilibrium, the e¤ects of marginal changes of applied and basic research on the growth
rate are identical.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
The positive e¤ect on private research productivity of this type of research policy outweighs the negative
e¤ect of the higher probability of replacement induced by public research, which makes the crowding out of
private R&D smaller or even, in some cases cause the opposite e¤ect. That is, we can …nd situations in which
an increase of public research implies a higher amount of private R&D investment. The e¤ect on private
research is thus ambiguous, as opposed to the previous case, in which private R&D always decreases after
an increase in public research. Concerning the result that the e¤ects of public applied and basic research
are identical in terms of growth, it is due to the fact that private …rms internalize the funds provided by the
public sector in such a way that if for instance, the amount of public basic research is increased, the …rm
will reduce its own investment in basic research and devote more resources to applied research. The same
applies for public applied research. Therefore, the behavior of the …rm neutralizes the possibility of having
di¤erent e¤ects on growth of these two types of public R&D. In addition, we …nd that an increase in either
applied or basic public research is going to reduce the ratio of total applied research to total basic research
and from Proposition 6 we know that this is going to have a positive e¤ect on growth. Thus, we …nd again,
as in the case of research subsidies, that a reduction of nAnB ; with nA and nB increasing, is bene…cial for the
rate of growth of the economy.
One of the main di¤erences between public funding of research and direct R&D subsidies is that with
public funding the government may choose the amounts devoted to basic and applied …elds. The result
established in Proposition 6 indicates that this di¤erence will not be relevant for the growth performance
of the economy. However, this does not imply that both policies are equivalent. If we want to compare
the growth e¤ects of research subsidies and public research, we can take as reference the no intervention
equilibrium and compare the growth and private research derivatives with respect to the policy instruments.
The following propositions compare the e¤ects of the introduction of these policies:
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Proposition 7 If sn = 0 and ¡ = 0; then the growth e¤ects of equivalent changes in public funding of
research and the research subsidy are equal.
Corollary 8 If sn = 0 and ¡ = 0, then
dn
d¡
=
dn
dsn
µ
1
n
¶
¡ 1:
Proofs. See Appendix B.2.
The previous results compare the e¤ects of the two policies at sn = 0 and ¡ = 0 because at this point
they can be made equivalent in terms of the public budget. Two policies are equivalent in terms of the public
budget if they imply the same …scal e¤ort.8 Thus, if the government’s budget is given by
Tt = snNt +¡A
max
t ¡ ¿kKt;
any two policies that we wish to compare must imply the same marginal change in the lump sum tax Tt used
to balance the budget. We …nd that the growth e¤ects are identical, however the e¤ects on private research
di¤er, since the subsidy will always induce a larger increase in this variable. Intuitively, the research subsidy
provokes a larger investment from the private sector, while the increase in public funding provides an extra
investment that allows the private sector to reduce their investment e¤ort. Therefore, even though their
e¤ect on growth is equivalent, they have di¤erent e¤ects on research intensity and probably on consumption
and welfare. The choice of policy will thus depend on how the authorities want to in‡uence private research
investment.
In summary, we …nd that both tax incentives and public funding of private research have unambiguously
positive e¤ects on long run growth and therefore, are research policies that can be undertaken without
fear of damaging the growth performance of the economy. However, public provision of research is a more
dangerous tool, since under some conditions, public research can be harmful for the private R&D sector and
the economy as a whole. Nevertheless, if public provision of research were exclusively con…ned to basic …elds,
or if basic and applied research are kept in the right proportions, the negative e¤ects of this type of policy
would be avoided.
Concerning the debate on whether public research should be more market oriented or be devoted only
to the accumulation of basic knowledge, the model predicts di¤erent results depending on which speci…c
policy is carried over. If we are considering public funding of private research and we take funds from basic
research to use them in applied …elds, the e¤ect on long run growth will be null due to the accommodating
behavior of private research …rms. However, in the case of public provision, a redirection of funds from basic
to applied …elds will have positive or negative e¤ects depending on the initial situation of the economy.
8See the proof of Proposition 7 for the adjustment necessary to make the changes in the instruments equivalent in terms of
the public budget.
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4 Welfare analysis
From equation (1) we can express utility at the steady state in terms of the stationary level of consumption
and the long-run growth rate
Vs(c; °) =
Z 1
0
ln(cAt)e
¡½tdt =
ln(cA0)
½
+
°
½2
:
The change in steady state welfare is a combination of the change in steady state consumption and the
change in steady state growth
@Vs(c; °)
@x
=
1
½c
@c
@x
+
1
½2
@°
@x
; (24)
where x represents any of the three policy instruments, sn; ¡a and ¡b:
This measure of welfare is valid to compare two situations of long run equilibrium. However, it does
not consider the periods of transition during which the economy moves from one equilibrium to another. In
order to re‡ect the transition we must analyze the e¤ect on lifetime utility. Rewrite equation (1) to obtain
the following expression for lifetime utility:
V (x) =
ln(A0)
½
+
Z 1
0
·Z t
0
°s(x)ds
¸
e¡½tdt+
Z 1
0
ln(ct(x))e
¡½tdt
where °t(x) and ct(x) are the time paths of the growth rate and the level of consumption per e¢ciency unit
after a change in one of the policy parameters. The e¤ect on utility will thus be given by the e¤ects on
the paths of growth and consumption. I will obtain …rst the e¤ect on the paths of consumption and capital
intensity and then use the latter to get the e¤ect on the path of the growth rate.
Let c = p(k; x) be the saddle path of the system which can be interpreted as the graph of a policy function
relating consumption and capital. Then we know that its slope, pk its positive and equal to
Ák
¸1
:9 Substituting
the policy function into the law of motion of capital; which we denote by '(k; c); the equilibrium dynamics
of the system can be characterized by a single di¤erential equation which describes the evolution of the state
variable along the stable manifold.
_k = '(k; c) = '(k; p(k; x)) = ª(k; x):
The solution to this equation, kt(x), gives the equilibrium value of k as a function of time and the policy
parameter: Using kt(x) in the policy function we would obtain the time path of c
ct(x) = p(kt(x); x):
To calculate the change in welfare we need the derivative of the whole time path of c with respect to x
dct(x)
dx
= pk
dkt(x)
dx
+ px; (25)
9We denote by Ák the derivative with respect to capital of the law of motion for consumption evaluated at the steady state,
and ¸1 is the negative eigenvalue of the system formed by (18) and (19) also evaluated at the steady state.
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where px is the derivative of the policy function with respect to the policy instrument or graphically, the
shift in the saddle path caused by the policy change.
In order to compute dkt(x)dx ; notice that kt(x) = k(t; x) must satisfy identically the original equation
_k(t; x) ´ ' (p(k(t; x); x); k(t; x); x) ;
where ' (c; k;x) is the law of motion of capital given by equation (18). Di¤erentiate both sides with respect
to x
_kx =
dkx
dt
= ['cpk + 'k] kx + 'cpx + 'x:
Hence kx satis…es a linear di¤erential equation. Moreover, when we start from a steady state, the coe¢cients
of this equation are constant and we can write
_kx = ¸1kx ¡ px + 'x:
The general solution is given by
kx(t) = exp (¸1t) kx(0) + (1¡ exp (¸1t))kx(1):
Since k is a predetermined variable, the change at the date of the policy change kx(0) must be zero. The
long run e¤ect, kx(1) = limt!1 kx(t); is in fact the derivative of the steady state value of k with respect to
the policy parameter, and can be expressed as
kx(1) = px ¡ 'x
¸1
:
The equilibrium time path of the derivative of k with respect to x is thus given by
kx(t) = (1¡ exp(¸1t))
·
px ¡ 'x
¸1
¸
;
that is, k will gradually reach its new steady state value at a rate equal to the negative eigenvalue.
Substitute now in equation (25) to obtain the …nal expression for the derivative of the time path of
consumption with respect to the policy parameter
dct(x)
dx
= pk(1¡ exp(¸1t))
·
px ¡ 'x
¸1
¸
+ px:
As before, we can identify the immediate change and the long run e¤ect
dc0(x)
dx
= px;
dc1(x)
dx
= pk
·
px ¡ 'x
¸1
¸
+ px;
where the …rst represents the necessary jump of consumption to get on the new saddle path and the second
is the e¤ect on the steady state value of consumption. Thus, consumption will initially jump to the new
saddle path and then it will approach its new steady state value at a rate equal to ¸1:
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The derivative of the growth rate and consumption per e¢ciency unit at date t are given by10
d°t(x)
dx
=
d°d(k)
dk
(1¡ exp(¸1t)) dk
dx
+
d°d(k)
dx
dct(x)
dx
=
dc
dx
¡ pk exp(¸1t)dk
dx
:
Hence, the change in welfare will be given by the following expression:
dV (x)
dx
=
dVs(x)
dx
+
24
³
½¡¸1
½
´
d°d(k)
dk +
(1¡®)³
k
¸1 (½¡ ¸1)
35 dk
dx
: (26)
Equations (24) and (26) give the general expressions for the e¤ect of the three policies on the di¤erent
measures of welfare. Given that the expression in square brackets is negative, the relationship between the
two measures of welfare will be determined by the sign of @k@x in each case.
Consider the change in welfare excluding the periods of transition, that is, equation (24). If steady
state consumption and growth evolve in opposite directions, the actual value of the discount rate ½ will be
determinant for the sign of the welfare change and we will not be able to give an unambiguous sign to the
change in welfare without assuming a speci…c value for the discount rate. Unfortunately, this will normally
be the case. Just for illustrative purposes, a calibration was made for empirically acceptable values of the
parameters:11 Table 1 suggests that the research subsidy may have positive e¤ects on welfare though only
for low values of the policy instrument. However, if we introduce a slight change in the parameters, the
range of values for which an increase of sn is welfare improving is substantially enlarged. In summary thus,
the calibration is suggesting that the research subsidy may increase welfare, though for high values of sn the
change in welfare becomes negative. Figure 1 illustrates the e¤ect on the two measures of welfare taking as
reference the level of welfare attained at sn = 0:
Regarding the e¤ects on consumption of public research, we cannot give an unambiguous sign to the
relevant derivatives, which implies that very little can be said about the e¤ect on welfare of policies a¤ecting
the level of public research. Nevertheless, the simulation results presented in tables 1 to 7 suggest that
the e¤ect on welfare of marginally increasing public R&D may be positive. In particular, Tables 2 and 3
present the e¤ect on consumption and welfare of marginal changes in public basic research. If public applied
research is zero, a marginal increase in basic R&D is negative for steady state consumption. However, the
e¤ect on the measure of welfare that includes the periods of transition is initially positive. In addition, we
found that this result is quite robust to changes in parameters other than the discount rate. Figure 2 shows
the relationship between welfare and public basic research. Observe that as the amount of basic research
increases its e¤ect on the growth rate diminishes while consumption per e¢ciency unit decreases due to the
taxes necessary to …nance this policy. As a consequence, the e¤ect on welfare becomes negative for high
values of public R&D investment. Table 3 shows the results when public applied research is positive. Notice
10The derivatives of °d are evaluated at the steady state because we consider the stationary equilibrium as the situation
before the tax change.
11Refer to Appendix C for the calibration results.
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that the introduction of basic research reduces the growth rate, implying an initial reduction of the measure
of welfare that includes the periods of transition. Further increases in ¡b will make the economy grow faster
as we move into the set of policy parameter combinations that increases °. Nevertheless, the two measures
of welfare fall for these higher values of public basic research as shown in Figure 3. Similarly, Table 4 shows
the results obtained for changes in public applied research. They show that there exists a range of values
of ¡a for which the e¤ect on welfare may be positive. The results obtained for the case in which the public
sector chooses the amounts of basic and applied research as if it were a private …rm (table 5) are very similar
and show a remarkable crowding out of private research.
The results under the public funding assumption, presented in tables 6 and 7, and Figures 6 and 7
indicate that the e¤ect on welfare of research subsidies and public R&D may be positive but only for low
values of the policy parameters.
5 Conclusions
This paper has addressed the issue of the need for an active research policy and has discussed the implications
of the di¤erent alternatives that actual governments have at their disposal. The analysis has been performed
in the context of an endogenous growth model with technological change in which private …rms may invest
both in applied and basic research. The di¤erence between these two types of research is relevant due to the
existing debate on whether public research should limit itself to basic knowledge or, on the contrary, should
be directed to projects with market applications. In addition, it has been found that subsidies to private
research will make the economy grow faster and may increase consumer welfare since this policy increases
private research investment.
Public research performed at public institutions has di¤erent implications depending on whether this
research is directed towards basic or applied …elds. When public research is exclusively concerned with basic
knowledge, the e¤ect on growth and welfare of this type of public investment is positive. This is due to the
fact that innovations arising from public basic research will add to the stock of knowledge and spillover to
the rest of the economy. These spillovers translate into more important technological improvements when
private R&D is successful, which determines a higher growth rate of aggregate technology and hence, of the
economy. However, if public institutions do research also in applied …elds, any innovation arising from this
type of research will be patentable. This implies that public institutions will compete with private …rms in
the patent race and thus, public research will have to be included when considering the rate of replacement
of a sector. This rate is given by the probability that an innovation occurs in a given sector and determines
the expected life of an existing patent. The e¤ect of public applied research on the rate of replacement
represents a negative externality for private research …rms, since the expected value of an innovation falls
when the rate of replacement increases. However, public applied research also adds to the stock of knowledge
and in consequence, causes a positive external e¤ect. The interaction of these opposing forces determines an
ambiguous e¤ect of public applied research on growth.
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On the other hand, we have found that public funding of private projects has an unambiguously positive
growth e¤ect. This is mainly due to the higher productivity of private research induced by this policy and to
the fact that it does not necessarily crowd out private research. Indeed, whether public funding of research
projects induces more private investment or not depends upon the initial situation of the economy and on
the actual values of the parameters though, for a set of plausible parameter values, it is easy to obtain the
result that private and public research behave as complements rather than substitutes. We observe that
in equilibrium, the funding of either applied or basic projects have identical e¤ects on private research and
growth. Therefore, if research policy is instrumented through the funding of private projects, it is irrelevant
whether the funds are used for basic or applied projects. This is turn implies that moving funds from basic
projects to more applied …elds, as proposed by the “new economic instrumentalism”,12 would have a null
e¤ect on long run growth. Additionally, we have compared the e¤ects on growth of subsidizing research as
opposed to public funding of projects. We have found that the e¤ect on growth of both policies is equal
when evaluated at the no intervention equilibrium.
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A Distribution of relative productivities across sectors
Let F (¢; t) be the cumulative distribution function of absolute productivity coe¢cients Ait at any given date
t: De…ne ©(t) = F
¡
Amaxt0 ; t
¢
: Then, ©(t) gives us the mass of sectors with a productivity coe¢cient below
Amaxt0 at date t: Therefore,
©(t0) = 1 (27)
d©(t)
dt
= ¡©(t) d (t) ; (28)
where d (t) is the probability that a sector innovates. Thus, depending on the assumption that we are
considering, it will be given by ¸p (nt) + ¸¡a (1 + b¡b) in the case of public provision or ¸p (nt;¡) in the
case of public funding. Equation (27) holds because at t0 no sector can have a productivity parameter above
Amaxt0 and equation (28) gives us the rate at which the sectors behind A
max
t0 innovate and get a productivity
parameter larger than Amaxt0 : These two equations de…ne a di¤erential equation whose solution is given by
©(t) = exp
µ
¡
Z t
t0
d (s) ds
¶
: (29)
We also know that
_Amaxt
Amaxt
= ° (t) ; therefore
Amaxt = A
max
t0 exp
µZ t
t0
° (s) ds
¶
:
De…ne a0 =
Amaxt0
Amaxt
; then
a0 = exp
µ
¡
Z t
t0
° (s) ds
¶
: (30)
Equation (30) de…nes an implicit function relating t with a0; the relative productivity parameter of a sector
that innovated on date t0: Let t = ~t (a0) be this function, and use it to perform a change of variable in (29)
so that we will now have
©
¡
~t (a0)
¢
= exp
Ã
¡
Z ~t¡1(t)
~t¡1(t0)
d
¡
~t (a0)
¢
~t0 (a0) da0
!
:
Notice that this function is giving us the mass of sectors with a productivity parameter smaller or equal
than Amaxt0 and that this is equivalent to the mass of sectors with a relative productivity parameter ait
below a0: Therefore, we can rede…ne ©
¡
~t (a0)
¢
= H (a0) as the value of the distribution function for a sector
that innovated on date t0: After a long enough period of time, all sectors will have innovated at least once
and therefore, H (a) will be the distribution function of any sector with a 2 (0; 1) : Therefore, the long run
distribution of relative productivity parameters across sectors will be given by
H (a) = exp
µZ 1
a
d
¡
~t (u)
¢
~t0 (u) du
¶
;
24
where we are using ~t¡1 (t) = a and ~t¡1 (t0) = 1: Notice that this distribution is time invariant.
In general, we will not be able to obtain the functional form of H (a) for any economic equilibrium.
Nevertheless, in order to study the dynamics of the economy it is enough to know that the distribution is
time invariant. However, we can get the expression of H (a) when the economy is in a steady state, since in
that case both the growth rate of the economy °; and the probability of innovation d; are constant and thus
(30) becomes
a = exp (¡° (t¡ t0)) ;
from where we can obtain the expression for ~t (a) as given by
t = ¡ lna
°
+ t0;
which allows us to obtain the distribution function as
H (a) = a
d
° :
B Proofs of propositions
B.1 Propositions under the public provision assumption
Proof of Proposition 1. The e¤ect on growth of sn is given by the following expression:
d°
dsn
=
1
2
µ
¯°
nA
¶µ
1 +
µ
1¡ ¯
¯
¶
nA
nB
¶
dn
dsn
:
Therefore, in order to …nd the sign of d°dsn we need …rst the sign of
dn
dsn
: This derivative can be obtained
from the system determining steady state equilibrium using implicit di¤erentiation techniques. Consider the
case of public provision of research. The relevant system of equations is the one formed by (21) and (22).
Rewrite these equations in the following form:
f1(k; n) = (1¡ sn)
h
° + ½+ ¸p (n) + ¸ [¡a (1 + b¡b)]
1
2
i
¡ ¸p (n) (1¡ ®)®L
1¡®k®
n
= 0 (31)
f2 (k; n) = ° + ½+ ± + ¿k ¡ ®2L1¡®k®¡1 = 0; (32)
so that we may de…ne the function F : (0;1)£ (0;1)! R2 whose components are f1(¢; ¢) and f2 (¢; ¢) and
use the implicit function theorem to …nd the derivatives needed. The Jacobian of F will be given by
JF (k; n) =
2664
¡¸p(n)(1¡®)³n (1¡ sn)
³
¸p0 (n) + d°dn
´
¡ ¸ ddn
³
p(n)
n
´
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®k®
(1¡®)³
k
d°
dn
3775 ;
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where d°dn =
1
2
³
¯°
nA
´³
1 +
³
1¡¯
¯
´
nA
nB
´
: The Jacobian may be inverted to obtain
[JF ]
¡1 =
1
det (JF )
2664
d°
dn ¡ (1¡ sn)
³
¸p0 (n) + d°dn
´
+ ¸ ddn
³
p(n)
n
´
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®k®
¡ (1¡®)³k ¡¸p(n)(1¡®)³n
3775 ;
where
det (JF ) = ¡ (1¡ ®) ³ d°
dn
µ
¸p (n)
n
+
(1¡ sn)
k
¶
(33)
¡(1¡ ®)³
µ
(1¡ sn)¸p0 (n)
k
¡ ¸ d
dn
µ
p (n)
n
¶
® (1¡ ®)L1¡®k®¡1
¶
;
is negative. The derivatives of F with respect to sn are given by
df1
dsn
= ¡
h
° + ½+ ¸p (n) + ¸ [¡a (1 + b¡b)]
1
2
i
df2
dsn
= 0:
Therefore, dndsn will be given by
dn
dsn
=
¡1
det (JF )
µ
(1¡ ®)³
k
¶h
° + ½+ ¸p (n) + ¸ [¡a (1 + b¡b)]
1
2
i
;
which is positive. Therefore, the derivative of the steady state rate of growth with respect to sn is also
positive.
Proof of Proposition 2. The e¤ect on growth of public basic research is given by
d°
d¡b
=
µ
(1¡ ¯) °
nB
¶µ
1 +
1
2
µ
1 +
µ
¯
1¡ ¯
¶
nB
nA
¶
dn
d¡b
¶
:
Accordingly, let us …nd dnd¡b . The Jacobian of F is not modi…ed but we have to compute the derivatives of
F with respect to ¡b: They are given by the following expressions:
df1
d¡b
= (1¡ sn)
"
(1¡ ¯) °
nB
+
¸b
1
2
2
µ
b¡a
1 + b¡b
¶ 1
2
#
df2
d¡b
=
(1¡ ¯) °
nB
;
which implies that the derivative of private research with respect to public basic research, as expressed by
dn
d¡b
=
(1¡ ®)³
·¡
1¡sn
k
¢µ
¸b
1
2
2
³
b¡a
1+b¡b
´ 1
2
¶
+
³
¸p(n)
n +
1¡sn
k
´³
(1¡¯)°
nB
´¸
det (JF )
;
is negative. The derivative of ° with respect to ¡b is therefore,
d°
d¡b
=
³
(1¡¯)°
nB
´µ¡
1¡sn
k
¢µ
¸b
1
2
2
¶µ
1¡ 12
³
1 +
³
¯
1¡¯
´
nB
nA
´³
b¡a
1+b¡b
´ 1
2
¶
+ ¸®(1¡®)L
1¡®k®¡1
2
p
bn2
¶
d°
dn
³
¸p(n)
n +
(1¡sn)
k
´
+ (1¡sn)k
µ
¸b
1
2
2
¶
+ ¸®(1¡®)L
1¡®k®¡1
2
p
bn2
:
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If public applied research is zero, d°d¡b is positive. However, if ¡a is positive, the e¤ect on growth of public
basic research will be positive wheneverµ
1¡ sn
k
¶Ã
¸b
1
2
2
!Ã
1¡ 1
2
µ
1 +
µ
¯
1¡ ¯
¶
nB
nA
¶µ
b¡a
1 + b¡b
¶ 1
2
!
+
¸® (1¡ ®)L1¡®k®¡1
2
p
bn2
> 0: (34)
A su¢cient condition for d°d¡b > 0 would be
1
2
µ
1 +
µ
¯
1¡ ¯
¶
nB
nA
¶µ
b¡a
1 + b¡b
¶ 1
2
· 1; (35)
but this expression still depends upon n: Recall that nBnA =
bn¡1+2b¡b
1+bn+2b¡a
: For given values of public basic and
applied research, nBnA is a function of n whose derivative is given by
d
dn
³
nB
nA
´
= 2b(1+b(¡a¡¡b))
(1+bn+2b¡a)
2 : Therefore, nBnA
is an increasing function of n when 1 + b (¡a ¡ ¡b) > 0 and a decreasing function when 1 + b (¡a ¡ ¡b) < 0:
Consider nBnA increasing. Then it will take its maximum value when n goes to in…nity. Since limn!1
nB
nA
= 1;
a su¢cient condition for (35) to be satis…ed is
1
2 (1¡ ¯)
µ
b¡a
1 + b¡b
¶ 1
2
· 1:
Consider now the case when nBnA is decreasing in n; that is when 1 + b (¡a ¡ ¡b) < 0: In this case, nBnA will
take its maximum value at n = 1b (for the range of values that we are considering) and condition (35) will
be satis…ed if
1
2
µ
1 +
µ
¯
1¡ ¯
¶
b¡b
1 + b¡a
¶µ
b¡a
1 + b¡b
¶ 1
2
· 1:
It follows that if Ã 2 ª1; condition (34) is satis…ed and d°d¡b > 0.
In order to prove the third part of the proposition, we have to …nd a su¢cient condition for d°d¡b < 0:
Notice that in equilibrium f1(k; n) = 0 and therefore
¸® (1¡ ®)L1¡®k®¡1
2
p
bn2
=
µ
1¡ sn
k
¶Ã
½+ ° + ¸p (n) + ¸ (¡a (1 + b¡b))
1
2
n (1 + bn)
!
;
which recalling (34) allows us to state that d°d¡b will be negative whenever"
1
2
µ
b¡a
1 + b¡b
¶ 1
2
#
> 1 +
° + ½+ ¸p (n) + ¸ [¡a (1 + b¡b)]
1
2
¸p (n) bn
: (36)
Notice that the numerator of the last expression of (36) is the discount rate of the ‡ow of pro…ts, which for
reasonable values of the parameters should be smaller than 1. In order to impose this condition, de…ne n1
as the level of research intensity implying a discount rate of 1. Then, a su¢cient condition for the discount
rate to be smaller than 1 is n < n1 or, equivalently,13
Â1 > Â2; (37)
13This condition is obtained from the equations that determine the equilibrium value of n; that is from (31) and (32).
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where
Â1 =
0@(1¡ sn)
³
°
¡
n1
¢
+ ½+ ¸p
¡
n1
¢
+ ¸ (¡a (1 + b¡b))
1
2
´
¸bp (n1) (1¡ ®)®L1¡®
1A
1
®
;
and
Â2 =
µ
®2L1¡®
° (n1) + ½+ ± + ¿k
¶ 1
1¡®
:
After having imposed this upper bound for n, a su¢cient condition for (36) to hold is"
1
2
µ
b¡a
1 + b¡b
¶ 1
2
#
> 1 +
1
¸p (n) bn
:
This expression implies that if ¡a is large relative to ¡b; the e¤ect on growth of public basic research will
be negative as long as the level of private research intensity is not so small that 1¸p(n)bn becomes excessively
large. Therefore, what we are requiring is that ¡a is large relative to ¡b but also that they both are not too
large. If we want to …nd a su¢cient condition that depends only on the values of the parameters we have to
impose a lower bound for n: Let n0 be the level of research intensity that satis…es 1¸p(n)bn = ²; where ² is a
real number.14 Then, if n > n0; condition (36) will be satis…ed when"
1
2
µ
b¡a
1 + b¡b
¶ 1
2
#
> 1 + ²: (38)
In addition, we have to impose the following restriction on the parameters in order to guarantee n > n0 :
Â3 < Â4; (39)
where
Â3 =
0@(1¡ sn)
³
°
¡
n0
¢
+ ½+ ¸p
¡
n0
¢
+ ¸ (¡a (1 + b¡b))
1
2
´
¸bp (n0) (1¡ ®)®L1¡®
1A
1
®
;
and
Â4 =
µ
®2L1¡®
° (n0) + ½+ ± + ¿k
¶ 1
1¡®
:
Thus, if ! 2 ­1 then d°d¡b < 0:
Proof of Proposition 3. The derivative of the growth rate with respect to public applied research is
given by
d°
d¡a
=
µ
¯°
nA
¶µ
1 +
1
2
µ
1 +
µ
1¡ ¯
¯
¶
nA
nB
¶
dn
d¡a
¶
:
14The choice of ² must take into account that if it is either too large or too small the set of parameter values satisfying the
condition may be empty. For a standard set of parameter values ² = 1; for instance, yields a non-empty set.
28
As in the previous propositions we compute …rst the derivative of private research intensity with respect to
public applied research. In order to do so we need the derivatives of the component functions of F , i.e.
df1
d¡a
= (1¡ sn)
"
¯°
nA
+
Ã
¸b
1
2
2
!µ
1 + b¡b
b¡a
¶ 1
2
#
df2
d¡a
=
¯°
nA
:
Next, pre-multiply
0@ df1d¡a
df2
d¡a
1Aby the second row of ¡ [JF ]¡1 to obtain
dn
d¡a
=
µ
(1¡ ®)³
det (JF )
¶"µ
(1¡ sn)
k
¶Ã
¸b
1
2
2
!µ
1 + b¡b
b¡a
¶ 1
2
+
µ
¸p (n)
n
+
(1¡ sn)
k
¶µ
¯°
nA
¶#
:
Notice that this expression is also negative. Now we can write d°d¡a as follows:
d°
d¡a
=
³
¯°
nA
´µ¡
1¡sn
k
¢µ
¸b
1
2
2
¶µ
1¡ 12
³
1 +
³
1¡¯
¯
´
nA
nB
´³
1+b¡b
b¡a
´ 1
2
¶
+ ¸®(1¡®)L
1¡®k®¡1
2
p
bn2
¶
d°
dn
³
¸p(n)
n +
(1¡sn)
k
´
+ (1¡sn)k
µ
¸b
1
2
2
¶
+ ¸®(1¡®)L
1¡®k®¡1
2n2
p
b
: (40)
Therefore, public applied research will have a positive e¤ect on growth only ifµ
1¡ sn
k
¶Ã
¸b
1
2
2
!Ã
1¡ 1
2
µ
1 +
µ
1¡ ¯
¯
¶
nA
nB
¶µ
1 + b¡b
b¡a
¶ 1
2
!
+
¸® (1¡ ®)L1¡®k®¡1
2n2
p
b
(41)
is positive.
A su¢cient condition for the expression in (41) to be positive is
1¡ 1
2
µ
1 +
µ
1¡ ¯
¯
¶
nA
nB
¶µ
1 + b¡b
b¡a
¶ 1
2
> 0: (42)
Given that nAnB as a function of n is increasing when 1+b (¡a ¡ ¡b) < 0 and decreasing when 1+b (¡a ¡ ¡b) >
0, it will take its maximum value when n goes to in…nity in the …rst case and when n = 1b in the second
case. Therefore, su¢cient conditions for (42) to be satis…ed are
1
2¯
³
1+b¡b
b¡a
´ 1
2
< 1 for 1 + b (¡a ¡ ¡b) < 0
1
2
³
1+b¡b
b¡a
´ 1
2
³
1 +
³
1¡¯
¯
´
1+b¡a
b¡b
´
< 1 for 1 + b (¡a ¡ ¡b) > 0
:
Under these conditions, d°d¡a > 0: Thus, if Ã 2 ª2; the growth e¤ect of public applied research will be
positive:
The expression of d°d¡a in equation (40) implies that this derivative will be negative wheneverµ
1¡ sn
k
¶Ã
¸b
1
2
2
!Ã
1¡ 1
2
µ
1 +
µ
1¡ ¯
¯
¶
nA
nB
¶µ
1 + b¡b
b¡a
¶ 1
2
!
+
¸® (1¡ ®)L1¡®k®¡1
2
p
bn2
< 0: (43)
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Therefore, following the same reasoning as in the previous proofs, the e¤ect on growth of public applied
research will be negative when ! 2 ­2.
Proof of Proposition 4. The derivatives of f1 (k; n) and f2 (k; n) with respect to ¡ are given by the
following expressions:
df1
d¡
= (1¡ sn)
µ
d°
dn
+ ¸p0 (¡)
¶
(44)
df2
d¡
=
d°
dn
; (45)
where we are using the fact that under these assumptions, the derivative of the growth rate with respect to
¡ keeping n constant is equal to the derivative of the growth rate with respect to n: Given (44) and (45),
the derivative of private research with respect to public research is
dn
d¡
=
(1¡ ®) ³
det (JF )
µ
d°
dn
µ
1¡ sn
k
+
¸p (n)
n
¶
+
1¡ sn
k
¸p0 (¡)
¶
;
which is negative. Given dnd¡ ; we can express the growth derivative as
d°
d¡
=
d°
dn
µ
1 +
dn
d¡
¶
=
d°
dn
µ
¡(1¡ ®) ³
det (JF )
¶µ¡¸~¼
k
d
dn
µ
p (n)
n
¶¶
;
where ~¼ = ¼Amaxt : Since
d
dn
³
p(n)
n
´
and det (JF ) are negative, then
d°
d¡ > 0:
B.2 Propositions under the public funding assumption
Proof of Proposition 5. The relevant equations under this assumption are (21) and (23) so that the
component functions of F are now
f1(k; n) = (1¡ sn) [° + ½+ ¸p (n;¡)]¡ ¸p (n;¡)
n
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®k® = 0
f2 (k; n) = ° + ½+ ± + ¿k ¡ ®2L1¡®k®¡1 = 0:
Hence, the Jacobian and its inverse are given by the following matrices:
JF (k; n) =
2664
¡¸p(n;¡)(1¡®)³n (1¡ sn)
³
¸p0 (n;¡) + d°dn
´
¡ ¸ ddn
³
p(n;¡)
n
´
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®k®
(1¡®)³
k
d°
dn
3775
and
[JF ]
¡1 =
1
det (JF )
2664
d°
dn ¡ (1¡ sn)
³
¸p0 (n;¡) + d°dn
´
+ ¸ ddn
³
p(n;¡)
n
´
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®k®
¡ (1¡®)³k ¡¸p(n;¡)(1¡®)³n
3775 ;
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where
det (JF ) = ¡(1¡ ®)³ d°
dn
·
(1¡ sn)
k
+
¸p (n;¡)
n
¸
¡
¡ (1¡ ®)³
µ
(1¡ sn)¸p0 (n;¡)
k
¡ ¸ d
dn
µ
p (n;¡)
n
¶
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®k®¡1
¶
is also negative.
The derivatives of the component functions of F with respect to sn are
df1
dsn
= ¡ [° + ½+ ¸p (n;¡)]
df2
dsn
= 0:
Thus, dndsn is given by
dn
dsn
= ¡
µ
(1¡ ®) ³
det(JF )
¶µ
° + ½+ ¸p (n;¡)
k
¶
:
Therefore, private research intensity increases with subsidies to research and so does the growth rate of the
economy.
Proof of Proposition 6. Recall that ¡ = ¡a +¡b: Given that both applied and basic public research
enter the component functions in equivalent positions, the derivatives of private research intensity with
respect to ¡a and ¡b will be identical. In addition, the equilibrium expression for the growth rate under this
assumption is given by
° = ¾¸
µ
1 + b (n+¡a +¡b)
2b
¶¯ µ
b (n+¡a +¡b)¡ 1
2b
¶1¡¯
:
Consequently,
d°
d¡a
=
d°
d¡b
=
d°
d¡
=
d°
dn
µ
1 +
dn
d¡
¶
: (46)
Therefore, we can talk about ¡ exclusively.
In order to obtain dnd¡ we compute the derivatives of the component functions of F as follows:
df1
d¡
= (1¡ sn)
·
d°
dn
+ ¸p0 (n;¡)
¸
¡ ¸p
0 (n;¡) ~¼
n
df2
d¡
=
d°
dn
;
where ~¼ = ¼Amaxt : Therefore, the derivative of private research with respect to public research is given by
dn
d¡
=
¡ d°dn
³
(1¡sn)
k +
¸p(n;¡)
n
´
+ ¸p
0(n;¡)~¼
nk ¡ (1¡sn)¸p
0(n;¡)
k
d°
dn
h
(1¡sn)
k +
¸p(n;¡)
n
i
+ (1¡sn)¸p
0(n;¡)
k ¡ ¸ ddn
³
p(n;¡)
n
´
~¼
k
:
Notice that the sign of this derivative is ambiguous, which implies that whether public research crowds out
private research or not, depends on the values of the parameters and the initial situation of the economy.
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Given dnd¡ ; it is immediate from (46) that the derivative of the growth rate with respect to public funding
of research is positive and equal to
d°
d¡
=
¡
¸~¼
k
¢
d°
dn
³
p0(n;¡)
n ¡ ddn
³
p(n;¡)
n
´´
d°
dn
h
(1¡sn)
k +
¸p(n;¡)
n
i
+ (1¡sn)¸p
0(n;¡)
k ¡ ¸ ddn
³
p(n;¡)
n
´
~¼
k
:
Proof of Proposition 7. In order to compare the growth e¤ects of sn and ¡; they must have
an equivalent impact on the public budget. So let us consider as the initial situation the equilibrium
corresponding to sn = 0 and ¡ = 0: In this situation, we must compare
d°
d¡ and
d°
dsn
¡
1
n
¢
: Recall that
d°
dsn
= ¡d°
dn
µ
(1¡ ®) ³
det(JF )
¶µ
° + ½+ ¸p (n;¡)
k
¶
d°
d¡
=
d°
dn
µ
(1¡ ®) ³
det(JF )
¶µ
¸
d
dn
µ
p (n;¡)
n
¶
~¼
k
¡ ¸p
0 (n;¡) ~¼
nk
¶
:
Notice also that from f1 (k; n) = 0; ¸ ~¼k
³
p0(n;¡)
n ¡ ddn
³
p(n;¡)
n
´´
= (1¡ sn)
³
°+½+¸p(n;¡)
nk
´
; therefore
d°
d¡
= ¡d°
dn
µ
(1¡ ®) ³
det(JF )
¶
(1¡ sn)
µ
° + ½+ ¸p (n;¡)
nk
¶
:
Since we are considering sn = 0,
d°
dsn
¡
1
n
¢
= d°d¡ :
Proof of Corollary 8. Recall that
d°
dsn
=
d°
dn
µ
dn
dsn
¶
d°
d¡
=
d°
dn
µ
1 +
dn
d¡
¶
:
Therefore, if d°dsn
¡
1
n
¢
= d°d¡ ; then
dn
dsn
¡
1
n
¢
= 1 + dnd¡ and
dn
d¡ =
dn
dsn
¡
1
n
¢¡ 1:
C Calibration
C.1 Public provision of research
Tables 1 to 7 show the results of the calibration of the model for the following set of parameters:
² Capital intensity, ® = 0:7: Therefore, we are considering a broad concept of capital that could include
human capital.
² Contribution of applied research to technological change, ¯ = 0:55:
² The discount rate and the depreciation rate are the standard values of ½ = 0:02 and ± = 0:05:
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² Other parameter values are: ¸ = 0:05; b = 5; ¾ = ln(1:2); ¿k = 0; L = 1: They were chosen so that
the rate of growth of the economy, the interest rate and the level of consumption were positive and in
a reasonable range.
² Regarding the choice of the range of values for public research, we took as reference the value of private
research intensity when sn = ¡a = ¡b = 0: At this equilibrium, n = 7:143:
² The following tables and …gures present the welfare e¤ects of the di¤erent policy instruments. By
default, the policy instruments that are not being analyzed are set to zero, except when indicated.
Table 1. Welfare e¤ect of the research subsidy
1a) ¸ = 0:05 1b) ¸ = 0:1
sn
dc
dsn
dVs
dsn
dV
dsn
0:0 ¡15:35 ¡1:53 13:77
0:1 ¡16:93 ¡5:34 12:17
0:2 ¡18:90 ¡12:5 7:88
0:3 ¡21:34 ¡26:8 ¡2:76
0:4 ¡24:59 ¡59:8 ¡30:59
0:5 ¡29:1 ¡156:9 ¡120:2
0:6 ¡35:7 ¡748:2 ¡699:8
sn
dc
dsn
dVs
dsn
dV
dsn
0:0 ¡11:55 8:81 27:08
0:1 ¡12:58 6:34 27:11
0:2 ¡13:83 0:77 24:73
0:3 ¡15:41 ¡12:00 16:14
0:4 ¡17:50 ¡44:30 ¡10:4
0:5 ¡20:30 ¡148:6 ¡106:4
0:6 ¡24:50 ¡920:0 ¡864:7
Figure 1: Welfare e¤ect of the research subsidy under public provision. (¸ = 0:1)
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Table 2. Welfare e¤ect of basic research when ¡a = 0
¡b
dc
d¡b
dVs
d¡b
dV
d¡b
n
0 -1.92 -0.65 1.10 7:14
0:5 -1.85 -1.15 0.51 6:93
1 -1.79 -1.65 -0.08 6:74
1:5 -1.75 -2.18 -0.68 6:56
2 -1.70 -2.74 -1.29 6:40
2:5 -1.67 -3.34 -1.94 6:25
3 -1.64 -3.99 -2.63 6:11
4 -1.59 -5.54 -4.23 5:85
6 -1.52 -10.66 -9.29 5:43
Figure 2: Welfare e¤ect of public basic research (¡a = 0).
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Table 3. Welfare e¤ect of basic research when ¡a = 0:5
¡b
dc
d¡b
dVs
d¡b
dV
d¡b
° n
0 1.05 0.20 -0.78 0.03241 6.57
0:1 0.50 0.05 -0.44 0.03232 6.46
0:2 0.20 -0.05 -0.25 0.03228 6.35
0:5 -0.31 -0.28 -0.05 0.03230 6.07
1 -0.64 -0.59 -0.12 0.03253 5.67
1:5 -0.78 -0.88 -0.34 0.03285 5.33
2 -0.86 -1.16 -0.60 0.03320 5.02
2:5 -0.90 -1.44 -0.89 0.03354 4.75
3 -0.92 -1.72 -1.19 0.03387 4.49
Figure 3: Welfare e¤ect of public basic research (¡a = 0:5).
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Table 4. Welfare e¤ect of applied research:
¡a
dc
d¡a
dVs
d¡a
dV
d¡a
° n
0 ¡¡ ¡¡ ¡¡ 0:03264 7:14
10¡8 8628 1940 -6314 0:03264 7:14
0:01 6.58 1.58 -4.63 0:03246 7:09
0:1 0.68 0.31 -0.27 0:03223 6:95
0:2 -0.10 0.13 0.27 0:03221 6:84
0:5 -0.78 -0.14 0.61 0:03241 6:58
1 -1.75 -0.48 0.49 0:03297 6:21
2 -1.20 -1.17 -0.15 0:03424 5:61
4 -1.23 -2.66 -1.76 0:03658 4:69
10 -1.14 -11.50 -10.85 0:04105 3:03
Figure 4: Welfare e¤ect of public applied research
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Table 5.
Welfare e¤ect of basic and applied research when ¡b = b¡¡12b and ¡a =
b¡+1
2b :
¡ dcd¡
dVs
d¡
dV
d¡ n
0:2 ¡0:06 ¡0:00 0:06 6:84
0:5 ¡0:07 ¡0:00 0:06 6:55
1 ¡0:08 ¡0:00 0:07 6:05
1:5 ¡0:09 0:00 0:09 5:57
2 ¡0:11 0:01 0:12 5:08
2:5 ¡0:13 0:01 0:15 4:60
3 ¡0:16 0:01 0:18 4:12
4 ¡0:27 0:02 0:30 3:18
5 ¡0:47 0:02 0:50 2:28
6 ¡0:91 ¡0:03 0:92 1:47
7 ¡1:67 ¡0:35 1:44 0:85
8 ¡2:30 ¡1:42 1:29 0:48
9 ¡2:49 ¡3:62 ¡0:07 0:30
10 ¡2:45 ¡7:68 ¡3:00 0:20
Figure 5: Welfare e¤ect of public research when ¡a = 1+b¡2b and ¡b =
b¡¡1
2b :
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C.2 Public funding of research
The calibration is made with the same set of parameters as before but using the corresponding equations
for this assumption.
Table 6. Welfare e¤ect of the research subsidy
sn
dc
dsn
dVs
dsn
dV
dsn
0:0 ¡15:35 ¡1:53 13:77
0:1 ¡16:93 ¡5:35 12:17
0:2 ¡18:88 ¡12:74 7:88
0:3 ¡21:34 ¡26:85 ¡2:76
0:4 ¡24:59 ¡59:80 ¡30:60
0:5 ¡29:06 ¡156:9 ¡120:2
0:6 ¡35:72 ¡748:2 ¡699:8
Figure 6: Welfare e¤ect of the research subsidy under public funding.
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Table 7. Welfare e¤ect of public research:
¡ dcd¡
dVs
d¡
dV
d¡
0 -2.15 -0.21 1.93
0.5 -2.11 -0.49 1.66
1 -2.08 -0.83 1.35
1.5 -2.04 -1.23 0.99
2 -2.01 -1.72 0.54
2.5 -1.98 -2.31 0.00
3 -1.95 -3.04 -0.65
4 -1.89 -5.11 -2.51
6 -1.78 -15.52 -11.9
Figure 7: Welfare e¤ect of public R&D funding.
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D Results when private …rms do not invest in basic research
In order to guarantee that the equilibrium value of basic research intensity nb is positive we have to impose
some restrictions on the parameters. For the general case without any type of public research, the equations
determining n and k in a steady state would be (7) and (8) but substituting the interest rate by its steady
state expression
r = ½+ °:
Solve for k in (7) and (8) and note that the …rst one is increasing in n while the second is decreasing.
Therefore, the following condition implies n > 1b :
Â5 < Â6; (47)
where
Â5 =
Ã
(1¡ sn)
¡
°
¡
1
b
¢
+ ½+ ¸p
¡
1
b
¢¢
¸bp
¡
1
b
¢
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®
! 1
®
Â6 =
Ã
®2L1¡®
°
¡
1
b
¢
+ ½+ ± + ¿k
! 1
1¡®
;
and where °
¡
1
b
¢
is the growth rate (see equation (20) for its functional form) associated to n = 1b and
p (n) = 1+bn
2
p
b
:
Notice that the introduction of the public research will modify the condition for positive private basic
research given in equation (47). If we consider public provision of research, the condition is
Â7 < Â8; (48)
where
Â7 =
0@(1¡ sn)
³
°
¡
1
b
¢
+ ½+ ¸p
¡
1
b
¢
+ ¸ (¡a (1 + b¡b))
1
2
´
¸bp
¡
1
b
¢
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®
1A
1
®
Â8 =
Ã
®2L1¡®
°
¡
1
b
¢
+ ½+ ± + ¿k
! 1
1¡®
:
Similarly, if we consider public funding of research projects, the condition for nb positive is obtained from
equations (21) and (23) obtained in section 3. Following the same reasoning used to derive condition (47) a
su¢cient condition for nb to be positive is
Â9 < Â10;
where
Â9 =
Ã
(1¡ sn)
¡
°
¡
1
b +¡b ¡ ¡a
¢
+ ½+ ¸p
¡
1
b ;¡
¢¢
¸bp
¡
1
b ;¡
¢
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®
! 1
®
Â10 =
Ã
®2L1¡®
°
¡
1
b +¡b ¡ ¡a
¢
+ ½+ ± + ¿k
! 1
1¡®
;
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and where °
¡
1
b +¡b ¡ ¡a
¢
is the rate of growth associated to a level of research intensity n = 1b +¡b ¡ ¡a.
The following subsections show the results when these conditions are not satis…ed.
D.1 Public provision of research
If the equilibrium level of private research is not large enough (i.e. n · 1b ), …rms do not invest in basic
research and therefore, na = n and nb = 0: Consequently, the arrival rate of innovations in the private sector
will be given by ¸n
1
2 and the research arbitrage equation will now be
1¡ sn =
Ã
¸
n
1
2
t
!Ã
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®k®t
rt + ¸n
1
2
t + ¸ (¡a(1 + b¡b))
1
2
!
:
The equations determining the steady state value of n and k are given by
° + ½+ ± + ¿k = ®
2L1¡®k®¡1
1¡ sn =
Ã
¸
n
1
2
t
!Ã
¸(1¡ ®)®L1¡®k®t
rt + ¸n
1
2
t + ¸ (¡a(1 + b¡b))
1
2
!
:
Following the same steps as in the proofs of propositions 1, 2 and 3 we can compute the derivatives of private
research and growth with respect to the policy variables. We …nd that these derivatives are given by
dn
dsn
= ¡
³
(1¡®)³
k
´³
° + ½+ ¸n
1
2 + ¸¡a(1 + b¡b)
´
det(JF )
dn
d¡a
=
(1¡ ®)³
µ
¯°
nA
³
¸
n
1
2
+ (1¡sn)k
´
+
³
(1¡sn)¸
k
´³
1+b¡b
¡a
´ 1
2
¶
det(JF )
dn
d¡b
=
(1¡ ®)³
µ
(1¡¯)°
nB
³
¸
n
1
2
+ (1¡sn)k
´
+
³
(1¡sn)¸b
2k
´³
¡a
1+b¡b
´ 1
2
¶
det(JF )
;
and
d°
ds
=
µ
¯°
nA
¶
dn
ds
d°
d¡a
=
µ
¯°
nA
¶µ
(1¡ ®) ³
¡det(JF )
¶Ã
¸ (1¡ sn)
2kn
1
2
+
¸¼
2kn
3
2
¡
µ
¸ (1¡ sn)
2k
¶µ
1 + b¡b
¡a
¶ 1
2
!
d°
d¡b
=
µ
(1¡ ¯) °
nB
¶µ
(1¡ ®) ³
¡det(JF )
¶
Ã
¸ (1¡ sn)
2kn
1
2
+
¸¼
2kn
3
2
¡
µ
¯nB
(1¡ ¯)nA
¶µ
¸b (1¡ sn)
2k
¶µ
¡a
1 + b¡b
¶ 1
2
!
:
Since det(JF ) is negative, the derivatives of private research with respect to the subsidy rate and basic and
applied public research are respectively positive, negative and negative. This implies that the derivative
of the growth rate with respect to the research subsidy is positive. The relationship between steady state
growth and public research is ambiguous. We …nd that d°d¡a will be positive whenever
¡a >
1 + b¡b
b
; (49)
41
since under this condition ¸(1¡sn)
2kn
1
2
¡
³
¸(1¡sn)
2k
´³
1+b¡b
¡a
´ 1
2
is positive. A su¢cient condition for negativity
would be obtained forcing
¸ (1¡ sn)
2kn
1
2
+
¸¼
2kn
3
2
¡
µ
¸ (1¡ sn)
2k
¶µ
1 + b¡b
¡a
¶ 1
2
< 0: (50)
Of course, a necessary condition is
¡a · 1 + b¡b
b
:
Requiring (50) is equivalent to requireµ
¡a
1 + b¡b
¶ 1
2
<
¸n
2¸n
1
2 + ½+ ° + ¸ (¡a (1 + b¡b))
1
2
: (51)
Let ¹n be the equilibrium value of research intensity when ¡a = 0: Then if the right hand side of (51) is
positive when evaluated at 0, there will exist a range of values of ¡a for which the condition is satis…ed.
However, the left hand side of (51) grows with ¡a and the right hand side decreases (because n is negatively
related to ¡a and the function is increasing in n): This implies that we will reach a value of ¡a smaller than
1+b¡b
b for which the condition is no longer satis…ed.
With respect to the growth derivative of public basic research, notice that if ¡a = 0; it will be positive
for any positive value of public basic research. If ¡a is positive, then a su¢cient condition for
d°
d¡b
> 0 is the
following:
¡b ·
1 +
µ
1 +
³
¯
1¡¯
´2¶ 12
b
2
³
¯
1¡¯
´2 : (52)
In order to obtain d°d¡b < 0 the next inequality must be satis…ed:
¸ (1¡ sn)
2kn
1
2
+
¸¼
2kn
3
2
¡
µ
¯
1¡ ¯
¶
nB
nA
µ
¸b (1¡ sn)
2k
¶µ
¡a
1 + b¡b
¶ 1
2
< 0;
which is equivalent to require
b¡b
µ
¯
1¡ ¯
¶µ
¡a
1 + b¡b
¶ 1
2
>
³
2¸n
1
2 + ½+ ° + ¸ (¡a (1 + b¡b))
1
2
´
(n+¡a)
n
: (53)
Of course, for (53) to be satis…ed it is necessary that (52) is not. The right hand side of (53) is decreasing in
n if ¡a > n. Therefore, if we impose ¡a > 1b and recall that we are just considering equilibria with n <
1
b ;
we can consider this expression decreasing in n: Therefore, a su¢cient condition for d°d¡b < 0 would be
b¡b
µ
¯
1¡ ¯
¶µ
¡a
1 + b¡b
¶ 1
2
>
³
2¸ (n^)
1
2 + ½+ ° (n^) + ¸ (¡a)
1
2
´
(n^+¡a)
n^
;
where n^ is the equilibrium value of research intensity when ¡b = 0:
Therefore, if initially private …rms do not perform basic research, the appropriate policy to induce them
to do so consists of research subsidies that will increase the level of private research since the e¤ect of public
R&D, though positive on growth under some conditions, reduces the total amount of private research and
thus, will not induce a positive level of private basic research.
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D.2 Public funding
When private research does not reach a high enough level, private …rms may not devote resources to basic
research. In the case of the public funding assumption this decision depends also on the level of public
research. If n < 1b +¡b ¡¡a; then all the research resources of private …rms are devoted to applied projects
of research. In this case, the arrival rate of innovations will be
¸ ((n+¡a)(1 + b¡b))
1
2 ;
while the research arbitrage equation will be given by
1¡ sn =
Ã
¸ ((nt +¡a)(1 + b¡b))
1
2
nt
!Ã
(1¡ ®)®L1¡®k®t
rt + ¸ ((nt +¡a)(1 + b¡b))
1
2
!
:
Therefore, the derivatives of private research and the rate of growth may be computed to obtain
dn
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= ¡
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(1¡®)³
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° + ½+ ¸ ((¡a + n)(1 + b¡b))
1
2
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;
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k
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µ
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¶
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+
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;
where
p (n) = ((n+¡a)(1 + b¡b))
1
2 ;
dp (n)
dn
=
1
2
µ
1 + b¡b
n+¡a
¶ 1
2
;
d
dn
µ
p (n)
n
¶
= ¡1
2
Ã
(n+ 2¡a) (1 + b¡b)
1
2
n2 (n+¡a)
1
2
!
:
Therefore, the three derivatives are positive as we obtained for the case in which private …rms performed
basic research.
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